Some interesting findings from this new paper on China’s solar industrial policy:
1. Local government support played a major role in scaling China’s solar industry and boosting innovation.
2. Production and innovation subsidies were more effective than demand subsidies.
3. Strong knowledge spillovers: subsidies increased innovation and production in nearby cities.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Einige interessante Erkenntnisse aus diesem neuen Papier über Chinas Solarindustriepolitik:
1. Die Unterstützung der lokalen Regierung spielte eine wichtige Rolle bei der Skalierung der chinesischen Solarindustrie und der Förderung von Innovationen.
2. Produktions- und Innovationssubventionen waren wirksamer als Nachfragesubventionen.
3. Starke Wissensspillover: Subventionen steigerten Innovation und Produktion in nahe gelegenen Städten.
2/ A Chosun Ilbo article discusses the possibility that US Forces Korea assets could be redeployed if the Middle East conflict prolongs, citing defence experts.
It does not report an active decision, evacuation, or confirmed relocation. https://www.chosun.com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2026/03/03/O3YZY4BAQZEO5NY3LTIG5JB4E4/
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: 2/ In einem Artikel von Chosun Ilbo wird unter Berufung auf Verteidigungsexperten die Möglichkeit erörtert, dass Vermögenswerte der US-Streitkräfte in Korea umverteilt werden könnten, wenn der Nahostkonflikt anhält.
Es wird keine aktive Entscheidung, Evakuierung oder bestätigte Umsiedlung gemeldet. https://www.chosun.com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2026/03/03/O3YZY4BAQZEO5NY3LTIG5JB4E4/
Aus exakt diesen Gründen gilt das Gewaltverbot. Weil das immer wieder so passiert. Es ist grundfalsch, im Völkerrecht lediglich eine moralische Norm zu sehen, wie Neumann es in diesem Thread behauptet. Das Völkerrecht verkörpert zugleich erfahrungsgesättigte Interessenpolitik.
🇬🇧 Translation
RT by @mmue_pungmu: The ban on violence applies for exactly these reasons. Because that happens again and again. It is fundamentally wrong to see international law as merely a moral norm, as Neumann claims in this thread. At the same time, international law embodies interest politics saturated with experience.
While America spend hundreds of billions fighting Israel’s war, China is continuing pedal to the medal on its electrification spree.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Während Amerika Hunderte von Milliarden für den Kampf gegen Israels Krieg ausgibt, strebt China bei seinem Elektrifizierungsboom weiter nach Medaillen.
“He wants others to do the dirty work of overthrowing the regime so he can claim credit as a leader and become the recipient of Western support, which is the only way that the Pahlavis have historically been able to rule over a large and diverse nation.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/02/iran-strikes-khamenei-leadership/
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„Er möchte, dass andere die Drecksarbeit des Sturzes des Regimes erledigen, damit er sich als Anführer einen Namen machen und westliche Unterstützung erhalten kann. Nur so konnten die Pahlavis in der Vergangenheit über eine große und vielfältige Nation herrschen.“ https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/02/iran-strikes-khamenei-leadership/
Read the whole thing: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-china-us-intervention-strategy
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Lesen Sie das Ganze: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-china-us-intervention-strategy
@mmue_pungmu
@communiscensura
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 02.03 16:58
Es sind die kleinen ehrlichen Momente im deutschen Fernsehen.
🇬🇧 Translation
RT by @mmue_pungmu: It's the little honest moments on German television.
@mmue_pungmu
@MarcusMStanley
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 02.03 16:42
Good thread from my colleague @jwdwerner on why China has no incentive to interfere in Iran.
The idea of a unified "axis of upheaval" or "axis of autocracies" acting together was basically a DC construct to justify higher military spending in a so-called new Cold War.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Guter Thread von meinem Kollegen @jwdwerner darüber, warum China keinen Anreiz hat, sich im Iran einzumischen.
Die Idee einer einheitlichen „Achse des Umbruchs“ oder „Achse der Autokratien“, die gemeinsam agiert, war im Grunde ein DC-Konstrukt, um höhere Militärausgaben in einem sogenannten neuen Kalten Krieg zu rechtfertigen.
“when you are in the business of selling weapons, you are also in the business of selling insecurity. And that means portraying a world that is brimming with threats, where diplomacy is devalued, and kinetic solutions are oversold.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/02/trump-iran-war-united-states-addicted/
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„Wenn es um den Verkauf von Waffen geht, geht es auch darum, Unsicherheit zu verkaufen. Und das bedeutet, eine Welt voller Bedrohungen darzustellen, in der Diplomatie abgewertet und kinetische Lösungen überbewertet werden.“ https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/02/trump-iran-war-united-states-addicted/
“Yet history suggests that destroying adversaries, especially those in charge of lower-tier powers, either directly or as a result of a campaign does not reliably incentivise others to behave as the superpower demands.” https://thecritic.co.uk/the-case-against-war-in-iran/
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„Doch die Geschichte zeigt, dass die Zerstörung von Gegnern, insbesondere derjenigen, die untergeordnete Mächte regieren, entweder direkt oder als Ergebnis einer Kampagne keinen verlässlichen Anreiz für andere darstellt, sich so zu verhalten, wie es die Supermacht verlangt.“ https://thecritic.co.uk/the-case-against-war-in-iran/
“Iran had no bomb. That, to Pyongyang, explains everything.”
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3345084/us-strikes-iran-north-korea-sees-nuclear-vindication?share=8oqzX3gpLFTK0JgJuZzZpqdeiiM8Tt11Cvw9HjT3j1UrMskn6wXpR5vKky119ixyv6gtrTbUxHdPRc6orFQA7hcY02ttsMJ7D19UXkM3rHw%3D&utm_campaign=social_share
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„Der Iran hatte keine Bombe. Das erklärt für Pjöngjang alles.“
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3345084/us-strikes-iran-north-korea-sees-nuclear-vindication?share=8oqzX3gpLF TK0JgJuZzZpqdeiiM8Tt11Cvw9HjT3j1UrMskn6wXpR5vKky119ixyv6gtrTbUxHdPRc6orFQA7hcY02ttsMJ7D19UXkM3rHw%3D&utm_campaign=social_share
“Not even hypocrisy remains —just irrelevance.” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/europeans-iran-war/
🇬🇧 Translation
“Not even hypocrisy remains — just irrelevance.” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/europeans-iran-war/
@mmue_pungmu
@TomSwitzerMedia
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 02.03 02:15
If the Iranian regime collapses, what comes next? Harvard's Stephen Walt argues that air campaigns rarely produce stable political outcomes and warns that the “day after” in Tehran could be far messier than many assume.
https://youtu.be/44Iu5SQa55A?si=Y7sD77Nmx1kwBWiV
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Was kommt als nächstes, wenn das iranische Regime zusammenbricht? Stephen Walt von Harvard argumentiert, dass Luftangriffe selten zu stabilen politischen Ergebnissen führen, und warnt davor, dass der „Tag danach“ in Teheran weitaus chaotischer sein könnte, als viele annehmen.
https://youtu.be/44Iu5SQa55A?si=Y7sD77Nmx1kwBWiV
@mmue_pungmu
@EvanFeigenbaum
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 01.03 17:50
It is patently obvious that regimes like Maduro's and Khamenei's should not have "counted on Chinese support" if this means "rescuing" them. The problem with this entire frame is that it mirror-images American foreign policy, refracting China's policy through the lens of what American strategists would do if they were Chinese Communists. And while there are elements of U.S. posture Beijing has adopted, including certain types of security partnerships and copycatting sanctions into Beijing's arsenal, there's little in China's posture that suggests it was ever going to "do like America" in the way it approaches its security interests. The word "ally" is doing so much hard work in the coverage I'm reading.
Venezuela and Iran were not "allies" to China in the way the U.S. has had allies, with attendant security obligations built into them. China has security interests in third regions and has increased its posture, but even in this domain it has leaned into internal security and policing, not commitments to others' external defense that it had zero core interest in getting sucked into. We can point to this or that arms deal, security partnership, or claim to political influence. But it was never the case that Beijing would treat a Venezuela the way some now mirror-image into its policy.
"Rescuing" a Maduro is not necessary to Beijing's core goals—it is the largest trading partner to more than 120 countries, buys oil on a global market, has maintained productive relations with key centers of power in the Middle East, and doesn't hinge its policy in any region on just one state.
The Middle East is an example—it had productive relations with Iran but also Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, even Turkey, and for a time with Israel. In Latin America, its every egg was never in Venezuela's basket. So to argue that Chinese policy is hung on alliances in the "American" sense with imputations of obligation, misses the point.
A speaker in this old @WSJ piece says that what China does in the world "only makes sense through the lens of its positioning vis-à-vis the United States." Yes, both can be strategic narcissists, prioritizing strategic competition with one another (I have written about this elsewhere). But that's not the whole story—first, because not everything China does in the world is about the Americans, but second because even those parts of its posture that are about "positioning vis-à-vis the U.S." do not require China be sucked into security conflicts in peripheral regions, "rescue" tottering regimes, or deploy in a third country's defense. China provides hardware, lifelines, and diplomatic support. But the whole point of its competition with Washington has been to lean into economic, technology, construction, and training offerings, not security partnerships with built-in obligations. And this is true even close to China's border: In Myanmar, for example, Beijing has played all sides over the years, gone from junta to Suu Kyi and back to junta, and interferes in what I would call an "ecumenical" rather than "obligatory" way. (And in some ways, Myanmar is a vastly more compelling interest to China than Venezuela, given the stuff that has gone down on the border.)
It's a mistake to presume that because China is trying to back foot the U.S. it will "do like America." That's not been their play.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Es liegt auf der Hand, dass Regime wie das von Maduro und Khamenei nicht „auf chinesische Unterstützung zählen“ sollten, wenn dies ihre „Rettung“ bedeuten würde. Das Problem bei diesem gesamten Rahmen besteht darin, dass er die amerikanische Außenpolitik widerspiegelt und Chinas Politik durch die Linse dessen reflektiert, was amerikanische Strategen tun würden, wenn sie chinesische Kommunisten wären. Und obwohl es Elemente der Haltung der USA gibt, die Peking eingenommen hat, darunter bestimmte Arten von Sicherheitspartnerschaften und die Nachahmung von Sanktionen in Pekings Arsenal, deutet Chinas Haltung kaum darauf hin, dass es jemals „wie Amerika handeln“ würde, was die Herangehensweise an seine Sicherheitsinteressen angeht. Das Wort „Verbündeter“ leistet in der Berichterstattung, die ich lese, so viel Arbeit.
Venezuela und Iran waren keine „Verbündeten“ Chinas in der Art, wie die USA Verbündete hatten, mit den damit verbundenen Sicherheitsverpflichtungen. China hat Sicherheitsinteressen in Drittregionen und hat seine Position verstärkt, aber selbst in diesem Bereich hat es sich auf die innere Sicherheit und Polizeiarbeit konzentriert und nicht auf Verpflichtungen zur Außenverteidigung anderer, in die es eigentlich kein Interesse hatte, hineingezogen zu werden. Wir können auf das eine oder andere Waffengeschäft, eine Sicherheitspartnerschaft oder den Anspruch auf politischen Einfluss verweisen. Aber es war nie so, dass Peking ein Venezuela so behandeln würde, wie manche es jetzt spiegelbildlich zu seiner Politik sehen.
Die „Rettung“ eines Maduro ist für Pekings Kernziele nicht notwendig – es ist der größte Handelspartner von mehr als 120 Ländern, kauft Öl auf einem Weltmarkt, unterhält produktive Beziehungen zu wichtigen Machtzentren im Nahen Osten und hängt seine Politik in keiner Region von nur einem Staat ab.
Der Nahe Osten ist ein Beispiel – er hatte produktive Beziehungen zum Iran, aber auch zu Saudi-Arabien, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten, Ägypten, sogar der Türkei und zeitweise auch zu Israel. In Lateinamerika war nie jedes Ei in Venezuelas Korb. Daher geht die Behauptung, dass die chinesische Politik an Bündnissen im „amerikanischen“ Sinne hängt und ihnen Verpflichtungen unterstellt, an der Sache vorbei.
Ein Sprecher in diesem alten @WSJ-Artikel sagt, dass das, was China in der Welt tut, „nur durch die Linse seiner Positionierung gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten Sinn macht“. Ja, beide können strategische Narzissten sein, die den strategischen Wettbewerb miteinander priorisieren (darüber habe ich an anderer Stelle geschrieben). Aber das ist nicht die ganze Geschichte – erstens, weil sich nicht alles, was China in der Welt tut, um die Amerikaner dreht, sondern zweitens, weil selbst die Teile seiner Haltung, bei denen es um „Positionierung gegenüber den USA“ geht, eine Rolle spielen. Sie verlangen nicht, dass China in Sicherheitskonflikte in Randregionen verwickelt wird, schwächelnde Regime „rettet“ oder zur Verteidigung eines Drittlandes eingesetzt wird. China stellt Hardware, Lebensadern und diplomatische Unterstützung zur Verfügung. Aber der Sinn des Wettbewerbs mit Washington besteht darin, sich auf Wirtschafts-, Technologie-, Bau- und Ausbildungsangebote zu konzentrieren und nicht auf Sicherheitspartnerschaften mit eingebauten Verpflichtungen. Und das gilt sogar nahe der Grenze zu China: In Myanmar zum Beispiel hat Peking im Laufe der Jahre alle Seiten gespielt, ist von der Junta zur Suu Kyi und zurück zur Junta gegangen und mischt sich eher auf „ökumenische“ als auf „obligatorische“ Weise ein, wie ich es nennen würde. (Und in mancher Hinsicht ist Myanmar für China von weitaus größerem Interesse als Venezuela, wenn man bedenkt, was an der Grenze geschehen ist.)
Es ist ein Fehler anzunehmen, dass China „wie Amerika handeln“ wird, weil es versucht, den USA den Rücken zu kehren. Das war nicht ihr Spiel.
In memory of 1 March 1919.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
In Erinnerung an den 1. März 1919.
“It is too early to say what will happen in Iran. But it is very clear that this is not what his base or the American people wanted.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/28/trump-is-betraying-his-base-by-waging-war-on-iran/
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„Es ist noch zu früh, um zu sagen, was im Iran passieren wird. Aber es ist ganz klar, dass dies nicht das ist, was seine Basis oder das amerikanische Volk wollten.“ https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/28/trump-is-betraying-his-base-by-waging-war-on-iran/
“People often expect sudden collapse, but they may not see how the system is built to handle shocks. Different groups usually prefer to keep the system together rather than push their own interests too far.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/28/iran-khamenei-ayatollah-assassination-israel-us-war/
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„Die Leute erwarten oft einen plötzlichen Zusammenbruch, aber sie verstehen möglicherweise nicht, wie das System für die Bewältigung von Schocks aufgebaut ist. Verschiedene Gruppen ziehen es normalerweise vor, das System zusammenzuhalten, anstatt ihre eigenen Interessen zu weit zu treiben.“ https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/28/iran-khamenei-ayatollah-assassination-israel-us-war/
Oman’s foreign minister says Iran agreed to “zero enriched uranium stockpiling.”
Within hours, Israel and the USA attacked them.
It was never about peace or uranium but about acting out Netanyahu's biggest bloodthirsty fantasy.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Omans Außenminister sagt, Iran habe zugestimmt, „die Lagerung von angereichertem Uran auf Null zu setzen“.
Innerhalb weniger Stunden griffen Israel und die USA sie an.
Es ging nie um Frieden oder Uran, sondern darum, Netanyahus größte blutrünstige Fantasie in die Tat umzusetzen.
Some quick analysis/reactions regarding the U.S. war on Iran.
1.) The damage to U.S. prestige and credibility from attacking Iran amidst ongoing negotiations -- again -- is incalculable.
Last time, planned U.S.-Iran negotiations were called off by Israel's surprise attack, about which U.S. claimed it had no foreknowledge.
This time, the seats in Geneva were barely cold before Trump ordered a full-blown regime change war, despite major Iran concessions and gathering momentum towards peace.
Who will ever trust Trump -- or the U.S. -- to negotiate in good faith again?
2.) Whether by incompetence or design, Trump's attempt to coerce Iran was destined to fail, for reasons Thomas Schelling described decades ago.
Coercion -- getting country to change its behavior, aka "compellence" -- is nearly impossible to achieve unless you articulate a clear set of demands. "Do exactly this or we'll shoot." Trump's demands were never consistent. What, exactly, did Iran have to do to avoid attack? Every principal in his admin had a different answer. They still do. VP and cabinet officials still can't agree whether this was a regime change war or not. (It is).
Moreover, amassing such a large "armada" to threaten Iran was counterproductive. Trump only paid attention to threats ("or else"), not assurances -- i.e. guarantees that if Iran complied, it would *avoid* the threatened U.S. punishment.
With Trump's many musings on regime change the last several weeks, Iran may have doubted that ANY concession would've been enough for Trump to back off. And they may have been right.
3.) Trump owns this war. He owns it. Yes, Netanyahu has pushed Iran regime change for years, but unlike last summer's 12 Day War, this attack was not a case of alliance entrapment. Trump chose it willingly. He could have off-ramped the U.S. at any point in this standoff, which he himself engineered by assembling an "armada" to confront Iran.
Trump's decision to pursue regime change in Iran is reckless and irresponsible. The American people did not want this war, which will only sap U.S. strength for unobtainable objectives ("freedom" in Iran) that aren't the U.S. business in the first place.
This action will cause severe blowback that will haunt the U.S. for generations. The U.S. had a chance to leave Middle East behind. But now Trump has put the U.S. front and center, once again, of the region's violence and dysfunction.
@defpriorities
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Einige kurze Analysen/Reaktionen zum US-Krieg gegen den Iran.
1.) Der Schaden für das Ansehen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der USA durch einen Angriff auf den Iran inmitten laufender Verhandlungen ist – wiederum – unkalkulierbar.
Beim letzten Mal wurden geplante Verhandlungen zwischen den USA und dem Iran durch den Überraschungsangriff Israels abgebrochen, von dem die USA behaupteten, sie hätten nichts vorher gewusst.
Dieses Mal waren die Sitze in Genf kaum kalt, als Trump trotz großer Zugeständnisse an den Iran und zunehmender Friedensdynamik einen umfassenden Regimewechselkrieg anordnete.
Wer wird jemals wieder darauf vertrauen, dass Trump – oder die USA – in gutem Glauben verhandeln?
2.) Ob aus Inkompetenz oder Absicht, Trumps Versuch, den Iran unter Druck zu setzen, war aus Gründen, die Thomas Schelling vor Jahrzehnten beschrieben hatte, zum Scheitern verurteilt.
Zwang – ein Land dazu zu bringen, sein Verhalten zu ändern, auch „Zwang“ genannt – ist nahezu unmöglich zu erreichen, wenn man keine klaren Forderungen formuliert. „Mach genau das, sonst schießen wir.“ Trumps Forderungen waren nie konsistent. Was genau musste der Iran tun, um einem Angriff zu entgehen? Jeder Schulleiter in seiner Verwaltung hatte eine andere Antwort. Das tun sie immer noch. Vizepräsident und Kabinettsbeamte sind sich immer noch nicht einig, ob es sich um einen Regimewechselkrieg handelte oder nicht. (Es ist).
Darüber hinaus war es kontraproduktiv, eine so große „Armada“ zusammenzustellen, um den Iran zu bedrohen. Trump achtete nur auf Drohungen („oder sonst“), nicht auf Zusicherungen – d. h. Garantien, dass der Iran, wenn er sich daran hält, der angedrohten US-Strafe *entgehen* würde.
Angesichts der vielen Grübeleien Trumps über einen Regimewechsel in den letzten Wochen mag der Iran daran gezweifelt haben, dass IRGENDEINES Zugeständnisses ausgereicht hätte, damit Trump zurücktreten könnte. Und vielleicht hatten sie recht.
3.) Trump besitzt diesen Krieg. Er besitzt es. Ja, Netanjahu drängt seit Jahren auf einen Regimewechsel im Iran, aber im Gegensatz zum Zwölf-Tage-Krieg im letzten Sommer handelte es sich bei diesem Angriff nicht um eine Falle einer Allianz. Trump hat es freiwillig gewählt. Er hätte die USA zu jedem Zeitpunkt dieser Pattsituation, die er selbst herbeigeführt hatte, indem er eine „Armada“ zur Konfrontation mit dem Iran zusammenstellte, aus dem Konzept bringen können.
Trumps Entscheidung, einen Regimewechsel im Iran anzustreben, ist rücksichtslos und unverantwortlich. Das amerikanische Volk wollte diesen Krieg nicht, der nur die Stärke der USA für unerreichbare Ziele („Freiheit“ im Iran) schwächt, die die USA überhaupt nichts angehen.
Diese Aktion wird einen schweren Rückschlag verursachen, der die USA über Generationen hinweg verfolgen wird. Die USA hatten die Chance, den Nahen Osten hinter sich zu lassen. Aber jetzt hat Trump die USA wieder einmal in den Mittelpunkt der Gewalt und Dysfunktion in der Region gerückt.
@defpriorities
“China offers the world predictability, not a more generous alternative to U.S. leadership. China can provide U.S. allies with investment, access to its markets, and help improving the competitiveness of industries, such as electric vehicle manufacturing.” https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2026/02/27/china-is-winning-by-waiting/content.html
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
„China bietet der Welt Berechenbarkeit und keine großzügigere Alternative zur Führungsrolle der USA. China kann US-Verbündeten Investitionen und Zugang zu seinen Märkten ermöglichen und dazu beitragen, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Industrien wie der Herstellung von Elektrofahrzeugen zu verbessern.“ https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2026/02/27/china-is-winning-by-waiting/content.html
There is no real left in mainstream Korean politics
A lot of western reporting will tell you about progressive, leftist, human rights-focused Korean presidents and politicians. Dr. Ben Engel explains why that's incorrect.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: In der Mainstream-Politik Koreas gibt es keine wirkliche Linke
In vielen westlichen Berichten erfahren Sie von progressiven, linken und menschenrechtsorientierten koreanischen Präsidenten und Politikern. Dr. Ben Engel erklärt, warum das falsch ist.
Der Niedergang Deutschlands komprimiert dargestellt. Selbstreflexion wäre so wichtig, statt die Schuld immer bei anderen zu suchen.
🇬🇧 Translation
The decline of Germany presented in a compressed manner. Self-reflection would be so important instead of always blaming others.
Korea’s high-precision mapping data will be allowed to be transferred overseas for the first time, after the government decided to grant conditional approval to Google’s long-standing request.
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-02-27/national/socialAffairs/Google-Maps-gets-go-ahead-to-use-Korean-domestic-data--/2533394?detailWord=
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Koreas hochpräzise Kartendaten dürfen erstmals ins Ausland übertragen werden, nachdem die Regierung beschlossen hat, Googles langjährigem Antrag eine bedingte Genehmigung zu erteilen.
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2026-02-27/national/socialAffairs/Google-Maps-gets-go-ahead-to-use-Korean-domestic-data--/2533394?detailWord=
Update: In appealing the life verdict, prosecutors argue Yoon's martial law was meticulously planned and intended indefinite seizure of power through military control of judiciary and an emergency legislative body, with no time limit set for restoring constitutional order.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue_pungmu: Update: In der Berufung gegen das lebenslange Urteil argumentieren die Staatsanwälte, dass Yoons Kriegsrecht sorgfältig geplant war und eine unbefristete Machtergreifung durch militärische Kontrolle der Justiz und eine Notstandsgesetzgebung vorsah, ohne dass eine Frist für die Wiederherstellung der verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung festgelegt wurde.
The use of a base on South Korean territory for an attempt to contain China rather than defend South Korea — an attempt that involved the use of air power, at that — is a major development that fundamentally alters the nature of the alliance.
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1246763.html
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue pungmu: Die Verwendung einer Basis auf dem südkoreanischen Territorium für den Versuch, China einzudämmen, anstatt Südkorea zu verteidigen – ein Versuch, der die Nutzung der Luftkraft involviert hat – ist eine wichtige Entwicklung, die die Natur des Bündnisses grundlegend verändert.
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english edition/english editorials/1246763.html
Your timely reminder that Obama negotiated a great deal with Iran (#JCPOA), which halted its nuclear program in its tracks, and did so without a war.
Trump ENDED that deal (in 2018).
Iran then resumed enriching uranium, and now here we are with another war of choice on our hands.
🇩🇪 Übersetzung
RT von @mmue pungmu: Ihre zeitnahe Erinnerung, dass Obama viel mit Iran ausgehandelt hat (#JCPOA), der sein Atomprogramm in seinen Spuren aufhielt, und das ohne Krieg.
Trump ENDED diesen Deal (2018).
Der Iran hat dann wieder Uran angereichert, und jetzt sind wir hier mit einem anderen Wahlkrieg auf unseren Händen.
“The 1,600-room Grand Hyatt Jeju, popular with Chinese tourists, said it recorded up to 1,590 room bookings per day during the holiday period, effectively reaching full occupancy.”
https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3344356/seoul-gains-tokyos-pain-over-lunar-new-year-politics-reshapes-chinas-tourism-map?share=6EHQ3CZgxYPszPEABnhyWKyLghzttjEfk61J9KK%2Bnu88OwJZSO4VencvChw8MGn%2FcFh5MyKsRcll81i3%2F208U8WT3F04lmmZqsb0PWdakdA%3D&utm_campaign=social_share
“If we remain passive, war could break out on the Korean Peninsula before we even realize. No one should be allowed to decide on military actions on the Korean Peninsula without our consent.” https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1246138.html
Sehr guter deep dive, der unwissenschaftlichem Quatsch mit dieser Recherche aktiv etwas entgegensetzt. Long read.
Bin froh, dass ich dabei mithelfen konnte.
🇬🇧 Translation
RT by @mmue pungmu: Very good deep dive, which actively opposes unscientific bullshit with this research. Long read.
I'm glad I could help.
As this Daily Show segment reminds us, Iran has been “weeks away” from having nuclear weapons for 30 years
@mmue_pungmu
@leckie_cameron
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 23.02 07:44
8. "But the regimes in Beijing and Moscow are both struggling with economic and political challenges and are now in the process of losing their major international partners. Their future prospects are deteriorating and the cold winds of isolation are growing stronger"
🤦♂️
@mmue_pungmu
@leckie_cameron
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 23.02 07:43
3. It's fascinating to see the complete acceptance of the gross violations of international law
From supporting genocide, to the kidnapping of Maduro, to the economic warfare against 🇨🇺
Not a word of criticism
The UN Command is opposing Seoul’s bid to open the DMZ to peaceful use by invoking “jurisdiction” it never originally had under the armistice.
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1245889.html
I have been sent this chart in various forms many times.
It is misleading resulting in wrong conclusions, so I decided to address the issue.
Yes, China generates more than double the US. But that number stripped of context is almost meaningless.
1. Population is the most obvious correction. China has roughly 1.425 billion people. The US has about 348 million. China has 4.25 times the population on nearly identical land mass (9.6 million km² versus 9.8 million km²). When you normalize for population, the story inverts completely. The US consumes about 12,700 kWh per person versus China at roughly 7,100 kWh. The average American consumes nearly 80% more electricity per person than the average Chinese citizen. On a per capita basis, the US is the electricity hog, not China.
2. China is the world's factory floor. It produces over half the world's steel, cement, and aluminum. Heavy manufacturing is one of the most electricity intensive economic activities that exists, and China does it at a scale no other country approaches. Manufacturing accounts for roughly 28% of China's GDP versus about 11% for the US. Industry consumes roughly 60% of China's electricity, while in the US the split runs approximately 38% residential, 36% commercial, and 26% industrial. Much of China's electricity "consumption" is actually being consumed on behalf of the rest of the world through exported goods. When an American buys a Chinese made EV, solar panel, or aluminum product, the electricity embedded in that manufacturing shows up in China's statistics, not America's. This is effectively offshored electricity demand.
3. Electrification rate tells you something critical too. China routes roughly 28% to 32% of its total final energy consumption through the electrical grid, compared to about 22% for the US. The US burns enormous quantities of natural gas directly for space heating, water heating, and industrial process heat without converting it to electricity first. If the US electrified at China's rate, American electricity consumption would be dramatically higher. The comparison isn't electricity versus electricity. It's two countries using fundamentally different pathways to deliver energy to end users.
4. GDP per unit of electricity exposes the services versus manufacturing divide. The US generates roughly $28 trillion in GDP off about 4,100 TWh, working out to roughly $6.80 of economic output per kWh. China generates roughly $18 trillion off 10,000 TWh, or about $1.80 per kWh. This doesn't mean China is wasteful. It means China's economy is physically producing things while the US economy is weighted toward services, finance, software, and healthcare, activities that generate high GDP per unit of electricity.
5. Climate and geography add another layer. While land mass is nearly identical, population distribution is radically different. Most of China's 1.4 billion people are concentrated in the eastern third of the country, creating enormous urban electricity demand centers. Large swaths of western China are sparsely populated desert and mountain terrain. China's sheer urban density in cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Chongqing creates electricity demand profiles unlike anything in the US outside of maybe the New York metro area.
The takeaway: the raw TWh number tells you almost nothing useful by itself. Per capita consumption still shows the US as the heavier user. Industrial structure means a large share of China's generation serves global supply chains, not Chinese consumers. Electrification rate differences mean the two countries aren't even measuring equivalent things. And GDP intensity reflects two economies at fundamentally different stages of structural composition. Anyone using the "10,000 TWh versus 4,500 TWh" framing without this context is either uninformed or being deliberately selective.
“By 2050, the GDP of the EU will be about half the size of China’s. And yet the EU countries speak condescendingly toward China and have blocked deals that would productively strengthen ties, such as the EU-Chinese investment agreement.” https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2026/02/17/the-dream-palace-of-the-west/content.html
“Hallelujah” - following the verdict against Yoon Suk-yeol, the loyal supporters of the former President lick their wounds in Central Seoul.
1/ South Korean lawmakers are pushing to restrict presidential pardons for insurrection and treason convictions.
The proposed amendment passed a parliamentary subcommittee, with the ruling party aiming to pass it within February. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260220146800001?input=1195m
Guys, American manufacturing is dying. The only bright spot was extremely efficient Chinese intermediates. And now that’s over bc our bipartisan China panic.
Mark pretends to care about Iranian proliferation but in reality uses the nuclear issue as a smokescreen for regime change. If he truly wanted to stop an Iranian bomb, he wouldn’t have spent years advocating for the destruction of a deal that prevented it from happening.
@mmue_pungmu
@Carlosa_DaNang
RT
von @mmue_pungmu 20.02 12:16
#Vietnam’s economy nears a pivotal leap past #Thailand
Backed by sweeping public investment and a strategic supply chain shift, Vietnam is positioning itself to surpass Thailand in economic scale as early as 2026-2027.
"Without serious reform, Thailand may lose its competitive edge and ultimately fall behind Vietnam.”
Vietnam's 2025 GDP was $514 Bn, Thailand's was $559 Bn.
Vietnam's 2025 GDP growth was 8% and Thailand's was 2%.
Vietnam’s economy stands at the threshold of a historic inflection point.
With resilient growth forecasts and a powerful wave of high-tech supply chain relocation, the country’s nominal GDP is poised to overtake Thailand in the near future, potentially redrawing the economic map of Southeast Asia.
The regional landscape is undergoing structural change. While Thailand, long the second-largest economy in Southeast Asia, faces mounting challenges from demographic aging to geopolitical volatility, Vietnam has emerged as a magnet for foreign direct investment and advanced manufacturing.
According to the latest data from Nikkei Asia and a report by Bangkok Bank, Vietnam is rapidly narrowing the gap and could surpass Thailand in nominal GDP as early as 2026-2027.
Vietnam accelerates on public investment and structural upgrade
Estimates show Vietnam’s real GDP growth reached approximately 8 percent in 2025. The government aims to sustain double-digit expansion from 2026 onward.
If this trajectory holds, Vietnam’s nominal GDP could approach US$600 billion by 2026 or 2027.
At that point, the country would overtake Thailand to become Southeast Asia’s third-largest economy, behind Indonesia and Singapore, with per capita GDP exceeding US$5,000.
The primary driver of this acceleration is an ambitious infrastructure strategy. The government has announced plans to invest the equivalent of 10 percent of GDP - around VND1.5 quadrillion (approximately US$60 billion) - in infrastructure projects between 2026 and 2030.
According to Nikkei, Can Van Luc, Chief Economist at the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV), forecasts that public investment in 2026 will rise by about 26 percent, directly contributing 1.6 percentage points to economic growth compared to 2025.
A series of flagship projects is being fast-tracked, including Long Thanh International Airport, expected to begin operations in 2026, and new railway lines linking northern provinces.
At the same time, deep-sea ports and the North-South expressway network are gradually taking shape, transforming Vietnam from a low-cost assembly hub into a critical logistics node in the region.
Shan Saeed, Global Chief Economist at Malaysia-based property technology group IQI Juwai, believes Vietnam is entering a decisive phase of economic maturity.
The country’s competitive edge is no longer anchored solely in expanding low-cost manufacturing capacity. Instead, it is shifting toward structural upgrading.
High-tech sectors such as electronics, semiconductors, precision engineering and advanced components now account for more than 30 percent of total manufacturing output.
Vietnam’s electronics exports have surpassed US$120 billion, overtaking several regional competitors, including Thailand, in this segment.
Rapid integration into electric vehicle and advanced component supply chains is helping Vietnam narrow the technological depth gap with Malaysia and gain an advantage over Indonesia, which remains more dependent on commodity-related production.
Meanwhile, high-value services are expanding swiftly, supporting Vietnam’s transition toward a multi-engine growth model.
The services sector currently contributes around 42 percent of GDP, underscoring its increasingly important role alongside manufacturing.
With more than one million IT professionals, Vietnam’s digital and information technology services continue to record double-digit growth, gradually converging toward the service-led development model seen in the Philippines.
Thailand confronts economic headwinds
In contrast, Thailand faces significant constraints.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development forecasts that Thailand’s real GDP will grow just 1.5 percent in 2026, down 0.5 percentage points from the previous year.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Thailand’s average growth has hovered between 2.7 and 3.0 percent.
Demographics pose one of the country’s most formidable challenges. With a median age of 40 - compared with 30 in Vietnam - Thailand is aging rapidly, leading to labor shortages and rising healthcare costs. High household debt is also weighing on domestic consumption.
The automotive industry, long a source of national pride, is showing signs of strain as Japanese manufacturers reassess their strategies.
In 2025, Suzuki Motor withdrew from automobile production in Thailand, while Honda Motor scaled back operations. Declining new car sales further reflect this shift.
In Indonesia, the region’s largest market, vehicle sales in the first 10 months of 2025 fell 10 percent, with Thailand experiencing a similar trend.
Beyond internal economic factors, geopolitical tensions have added pressure. Border frictions with Cambodia that began in May and escalated in December last year have disrupted bilateral trade and tourism flows.
Khang Vu, a scholar at Boston University, noted: “Geopolitical stability is crucial for sustaining growth in Southeast Asia. The Thailand-Cambodia border conflict exposes vulnerabilities that could unsettle foreign investors.”
Thai experts speak out
Vietnam’s ascent has sparked concern among segments of Thailand’s academic and business communities.
Dr Nonarit Bisonyabut, Senior Research Fellow at the Thailand Development Research Institute, warned that Thailand risks falling behind.
He argued that Thailand’s ambition to achieve high-income status by 2036 now appears distant, with revised projections potentially pushing the milestone to 2088-2093.
“Thailand once sought to catch up with China and Malaysia, which are on track to reach high-income status by 2025 and 2030 respectively. Now, we risk reaching that benchmark at the same time as Vietnam - around 2088 - despite having set our target decades earlier,” Nonarit said.
He also pointed out that Vietnam is pursuing decisive administrative reforms to enhance efficiency, while Thailand remains entangled in short-term or controversial initiatives such as cannabis liberalization and mega-projects lacking proven feasibility.
“Looking ahead, China and South Korea are prioritizing Vietnam over Thailand. Both countries are winners of the digital era, with China emerging alongside the US as an AI leader.
"Without serious reform, Thailand may lose its competitive edge and ultimately fall behind Vietnam,” he cautioned.
Kriengkrai Thiennukul, Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries, likewise acknowledged that Vietnam is better positioned to capitalize on evolving global trade rules.
“Vietnam demonstrates stronger competitiveness, better skills and higher GDP and export growth figures. If Thailand talks without acting - or acts too slowly - we will lose our standing,” he stressed.
Poj Aramwattananont, Chairman of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, emphasized that Vietnam’s heavy investment in infrastructure is a key strategy to sustain growth and mitigate tariff risks.
Although he maintained that Thailand still retains advantages in geography and supporting industries, he admitted that investors remain hesitant amid policy uncertainty.
Observers also note that Vietnam is not without risk. Its heavy reliance on exports - holding the third-largest trade surplus with the US - leaves the economy vulnerable to tariff fluctuations, particularly under the administration of US President Donald Trump.
The OECD projects Vietnam’s GDP growth in 2026 could reach 6.2 percent, below the government’s 10% target, due to potential export slowdowns.
Shan Saeed recommends that Vietnam focus on expanding profit margins, safeguarding intellectual property and digitizing logistics to avoid the middle-income trap.
Advancing up the value chain will require sustained investment in human capital and reliable energy infrastructure.
Southeast Asia’s economic future is being reshaped. While Thailand retains solid foundations in finance and healthcare, the pace and decisiveness of reform are propelling Vietnam forward, setting the stage for a remarkable shift in economic scale in the years ahead.
Info via Vietnam Net Global and other financial sources.