Easiest way to judge this, given the lack of evidence, is to compare the predictions of Desch sand Kofman in a year from now.
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: Angesichts des Mangels an Beweisen lässt sich dies am einfachsten beurteilen, indem man die Vorhersagen von Desch und Kofman in einem Jahr vergleicht.
In addition to prospect of waging its war in search of an effective strategy, the Administration is asserting false or unproven claims about Iran's capabilities harking back to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/us/politics/trump-iran-claims-nuclear-weapons.html
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: Neben der Aussicht, ihren Krieg auf der Suche nach einer wirksamen Strategie zu führen, stellt die Regierung auch falsche oder unbewiesene Behauptungen über die Fähigkeiten Irans auf, die auf die US-Invasion im Irak im Jahr 2003 zurückgehen. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/us/politics/trump-iran-claims-nuclear-weapons.html
Brett McGurk: a career defined by Middle East policy failures, a selective interest in human rights that somehow rarely extends beyond Iran, and the unearned status of a 'wise man.' The blob's immunity to accountability remains its most consistent feature.
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: Brett McGurk: eine Karriere, die von Misserfolgen in der Nahostpolitik, einem selektiven Interesse an Menschenrechten, das irgendwie selten über den Iran hinausgeht, und dem unverdienten Status eines „weisen Mannes“ geprägt ist. Die Immunität des Blobs gegenüber Rechenschaftspflicht bleibt sein beständigstes Merkmal.
🇺🇸 🇮🇷 ☢️ “Witkoff’s statement reveals both a misunderstanding of history and a misreading of how Iran makes decisions… From Tehran’s perspective, it is the US that has a record of retreating under fire, whether in Vietnam or in Beirut in 1983” https://www.ft.com/content/99a5f753-7c50-4b88-a42a-e438b31ab7fb
@KimGhattas
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: 🇺🇸 🇮🇷 ☢️ „Witkoffs Aussage offenbart sowohl ein Missverständnis der Geschichte als auch eine Fehlinterpretation der Art und Weise, wie der Iran Entscheidungen trifft … Aus Teherans Sicht sind es die USA, die sich nachweislich unter Beschuss zurückziehen, sei es in Vietnam oder in Beirut im Jahr 1983.“ https://www.ft.com/content/99a5f753-7c50-4b88-a42a-e438b31ab7fb
@KimGhattas
Let's never forget what the Economist told us about losses during this disastrous war. And hold them to account once we have the real numbers.
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/02/23/how-russias-fatalities-compare-with-ukraines?taid=b36db013-ec9b-4811-98bd-6a25f29b1991&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter
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Vergessen wir nie, was uns der Economist über die Verluste während dieses verheerenden Krieges erzählt hat. Und ziehen Sie sie zur Rechenschaft, sobald wir die tatsächlichen Zahlen haben.
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/02/23/how-russias-fatalities-compare-with-ukraines?taid=b36db013-ec9b-4811-98bd-6a25f29b1991&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter
Everything that has happened recently demonstrates that the Iranians would have been reckless not to have started a crash program after June 2025.
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Alles, was in letzter Zeit passiert ist, zeigt, dass die Iraner leichtsinnig gewesen wären, wenn sie nach Juni 2025 kein Crash-Programm gestartet hätten.
The enemy always has a vote.
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Der Feind hat immer eine Stimme.
Das sind die Leute, die jahrelang auch nur einen Andeutung einer schwierigen ukrainischen Lage als pro-russische Propaganda verteufelten. Wir dürfen uns auf Ihre Rechtfertigungen nach dem Krieg freuen.
🇬🇧 Translation
These are the people who for years demonized even a hint of a difficult Ukrainian situation as pro-Russian propaganda. We can look forward to your justifications after the war.
Warning signs. Won't help. Western Tech-Determinists still believe in the MOLE CRICKETT legend.
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Warnzeichen. Wird nicht helfen. Westliche Tech-Deterministen glauben immer noch an die MOLE CRICKETT-Legende.
.@KimGhattas: “Tehran has its own reading of history and capitulation, which could be driving its current negotiating strategy. From its perspective, it is the US that has a record of retreating under fire, whether in Vietnam or, more immediately relevant, in Beirut.. in 1983..”
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: .@KimGhattas: „Teheran hat seine eigene Lesart der Geschichte und der Kapitulation, die seine aktuelle Verhandlungsstrategie bestimmen könnte. Aus seiner Sicht sind es die USA, die eine Bilanz des Rückzugs unter Beschuss haben, sei es in Vietnam oder, was unmittelbarer ist, in Beirut … im Jahr 1983.“
Interesting.
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: Interessant.
"Iran is an existential threat to the United States that requires overwhelming force — and also so weak it can’t meaningfully retaliate."
Somehow both are true.
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: „Der Iran ist eine existenzielle Bedrohung für die Vereinigten Staaten, die überwältigende Gewalt erfordert – und außerdem so schwach, dass er keinen sinnvollen Gegenschlag ausführen kann.“
Irgendwie stimmt beides.
US intel report: "Iran has space launch vehicles it could use to develop a militarily-viable ICBM by 2035 should Tehran decide to pursue the capability."
Iran is 10 years away from building an ICBM that could hit US.
No ticking time bomb.
For more, see my paper: https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/why-iran-talks-should-deal-only-with-nuclear-issues/
@defpriorities
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: US-Geheimdienstbericht: „Der Iran verfügt über Trägerraketen, mit denen er bis 2035 eine militärisch einsetzbare Interkontinentalrakete entwickeln könnte, sollte Teheran sich dazu entschließen, diese Fähigkeit weiterzuentwickeln.“
Der Iran ist zehn Jahre davon entfernt, eine Interkontinentalrakete zu bauen, die die USA treffen könnte.
Keine tickende Zeitbombe.
Weitere Informationen finden Sie in meinem Artikel: https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/why-iran-talks-should-deal-only-with-nuclear-issues/
@defpriorities
Schön, dass wir doch noch eine Ablöse für Bensebaini bekommen haben.
🇬🇧 Translation
It's nice that we still got a transfer fee for Bensebaini.
US Vice Admiral Fred Kacher has been removed from his position as director of the Joint Staff after only taking the post in December, three sources familiar with the matter told Reuters https://reut.rs/3MZv0lj
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RT von @RoPoppZurich: US-Vizeadmiral Fred Kacher wurde von seiner Position als Direktor des Joint Staff entfernt, nachdem er den Posten erst im Dezember angetreten hatte, teilten drei mit der Angelegenheit vertraute Quellen Reuters https://reut.rs/3MZv0lj mit
The #US is intensifying the drumbeat of war against #Iran, with zero explanation of the non existent legal authority to use force and zero evidence of an “imminent threat” other than hypothetical scenarios based on possible future intentions…
All Wars, including “wars of choice”, have horrific costs. That is the reason for the restraints and limitations established by international norms…
This is #Iraq redux … it seems we never learn …
"Israeli intelligence has concluded that even with the imminent arrival of the USS Gerald R Ford later this week, the US has military capacity to sustain just a four to five day intense aerial assault on Iran, or a week of lower-intensity strikes."
https://www.ft.com/content/0408deca-ecca-49ab-bff6-985ef83897ce
Lots of wisdom in this short reflection, arguing many
"overestimated Ukrainian unity and resilience while underestimating Russia’s authoritarian consolidation, blind to the deep-seated crisis of liberal democracy and the political fragmentation of Western elites."
The tenor of the leaks to the NYT and WP today (see my two previous tweets) suggest we may not be heading toward the apocalyptic war everyone is predicting, and that Trump may be trying to get out of a corner in which he boxed himself. If Iran perceives that the U.S. attack is not going to threaten regime continuity, this will mean the scope of its response is likely to be relatively limited. What worries me is that this operation was reportedly agreed by Trump and Netanyahu in December, so that Israel will be frustrated if the U.S. contains it, or backs out. In that case, what are the Israelis likely to do? Most probably escalate dramatically in Lebanon.
In nearly five decades of mutual antagonism, the U.S. and Iran have never been so close to a major war. Escalation risks make any conflict scenario perilous for all concerned. A narrow path to averting war exists, but time is of the essence. @CrisisGroup’s new statement:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/middle-east-north-africa/iran/us-and-iran-can-still-avoid-war
Interesting twist since yesterday on the U.S. position toward an attack against Iran. Many are assuming the Thursday meeting will be make or break, but the NYT has been reporting that “Mr. Trump has been leaning toward conducting an initial strike in coming days intended to demonstrate to Iran’s leaders that they must be willing to agree to give up the ability to make a nuclear … Should those steps fail to convince Tehran to meet his demands, Mr. Trump told advisers, he would leave open the possibility of a military assault later this year intended to help topple Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader.” To many, that will sound like kicking the can down the road, meaning we may not see the apocalypse this week: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/23/us/politics/general-caine-iran-strikes-trump.html
The thuggishness of Israeli settlers as they drive Palestinians from their land grows worse; here they shot a 14-year-old boy. And this ethnic cleansing happens with the complicity of the United States government. Powerful story by @azamsahmed: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/23/world/palestinian-west-bank-settlers-displacement.html
He doesn’t like to talk about “when will this end” because his answer’s been the same for years—Ukraine will win soon, they just need more support
Snyder & co have done Ukrainians a disservice by rejecting negotiations outright & insisting the war can only end in total victory
Separate from the vile content, why does the @nytimes keep just letting him write the same column over and over again?
Quite an obliteration it was.
All due respect, I disagree w/this article, because it doesn't take into account that now, unlike two years ago, Iran sees no value in a calibrated, limited response, but rather sees regional destabilization as the only way to restore its degraded deterrence.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-diminishing-risk-of-an-iran-attack-4adae3a5
Für die Akten.
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For the files.
R to @RoPoppZurich: ...civilian airports to move the vast amount of equipment and assets."
"The reliance of the U.S. on European allies over the past month has been HUGE. Simply, they could not have done this without the UK, Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain supporting and allowing the U.S. to use bases and ..
Absolutely insane language.
Pres Trump ends up being puzzled because there's a legion of prompters on Middle Eastern affairs in Washington who have been wrong on the region for 50 years but never punished or banished.
Trump says he wants a negotiated solution, but he can’t make up his mind what his negotiating position actually is. One moment, he just wants to keep Iran from getting a nuclear bomb; at other moments, he demands that Iran stop enriching any uranium, even at low levels suitable only for civilian uses; at still other moments, he wants the whole regime to collapse.
I thought it was AI for a second but then I realized it was so absurd that it couldn't even have occurred to anyone to create a fake video of it.
Great read by @EricSchmittNYT .It confirms what European and Middle Eastern officials have warned for years: Iran has spent decades preparing for asymmetric warfare through proxies and gray-zone forces to target Western interests: New intelligence shows Tehran could direct attacks on U.S. targets abroad. There’s rising “chatter,” no confirmed plot yet — but the risk is climbing fast.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/22/us/politics/iran-terrorist-attacks-proxies-trump.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share via @NYTimes
The limited strike to pressure Iran to make a deal with the threat of more seems extremely problematic on so many levels. Messaging that now is a sign of weakness in the negotiations. Sorry, that’s the reality. I can’t believe military commanders would recommend this.
BBC World Service compiled evidence on 160 cases of children shot in Gaza by the IDF.
It found that in 95 cases (60%) the child was shot in the head or heart.
In most cases the victim was under 12.
Targeted murder of young children by Israel.
Plenty of US - Iran misinformation on this platform. Reminder
• Trump has NOT decided about attack
• Third round of talks on Thursday
• No confirmation on bases evacuated in region except for Syria
• No one fled to Russia
• Saudi Arabia is NOT advocating regime change